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THE EMERGENCE OF POST-TRADITIONAL OMAN 
 
Based on a lecture given by the 2004 Sir William Luce Fellow 
Dr. J. E. Peterson 
 
It seems advisable at the outset to locate the specific topic of this essay within a broader 
discourse.  The exercise and experience of politics in Oman pertains directly to, first, the 
puzzle of why monarchies in the Middle East and especially those in the Gulf have been so 
resilient, and, second, the related question of whether the continued existence of these 
monarchies should be considered an instance of Middle East exceptionalism.1  A plethora of 
theories have been advanced on the conundrum of why nearly all of the world’s remaining 
quasi-absolute monarchies should exist in the Middle East, specifically the Arab, Islamic 
Middle East.  Are the underlying factors for this cultural, historical, or accidental? 
 
While the present essay does not attempt to provide an answer to these questions, various 
aspects of the debate are directly relevant here.  Lisa Anderson, in an article coining the term 
‘the resilience of monarchy’, rejects the explanation of Middle Eastern exceptionalism and 
cultural determinism and instead proposes that the appearance of monarchies in the region 
resulted from British imperial policy at a time of the formation of new states and their 
durability results from an affinity ‘between monarchy as a regime type and the projects of 
nation building and state formation.’2  In a later essay, Anderson suggests that not only were 
monarchies better equipped to handle prevailing conditions at the time of their establishment 
but also that they may be better suited at the present stage to dealing with the problems and 
challenges of interaction with the outside world and in marrying domestic needs and 
constituencies to international resources.3 
 
But there are two long-term problems with monarchies.  First, there seems to be little intrinsic 
motivation for a monarch to be concerned with the future development of his country, apart 
from securing the continuation of his dynasty and assuring his place in history.4  But the 
modernising ethos or intention of Middle East monarchies, with Oman firmly in the midst of 
the fray, inevitably provokes the emergence of cultural change, changes in social groups, and 
political demands that monarchies seem ill-equipped to handle.  This introduces what Samuel 
Huntington described as ‘the king’s dilemma’:  how to accommodate social and economic 
transformation and expanding political expectations without alienating core constituencies 
and creating hostile forces.5  These problems seem particularly applicable to Oman, where 
the present ruler has no direct heir and has kept silent on the question of succession, yet 
where the pace of socioeconomic development continues to quicken and society grows more 
complex and heterogeneous. 
 
At the same time, it should be remembered that while monarchies have considerable 
similarities and common interests, they are not identical, neither in the essential 
characteristics of individual countries nor in the particular methods and means of maintaining 
and retaining power.  Oman, as a traditional monarchy or sultanate, represents one of only 
four types of monarchies in the Middle East.6  While similar in many ways to its neighbours 
in the Gulf, Oman is also unique because of the geographical and social diversity of the 
country compared to the smaller Gulf states, because of its long existence as a quasi-national 
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entity, because its history and political experience have been shaped by the prevalent Ibadi 
sect, and because of the two-and-a-half-century legacy of the Al Bu Sacid dynasty.7 
 
Before continuing any further, it undoubtedly would be useful to parse the title of this essay.  
Thus, ‘The Emergence of Post-Traditional Oman’ in reverse order: 
 
Oman.  I have chosen to concentrate on Oman for several reasons.  Foremost, it is a country 
with which I have been happily involved for more than a quarter-century and with which I 
feel I have at least a reasonably good acquaintance.  But, in addition, it seems to me that 
Oman serves as an excellent illustration or case study of the transitional phase between 
‘tradition’ – and I use that word with understandable caution – and ‘modernity’ – which is 
also perhaps an equally fraughtful term.  I will discuss these terms and their relativity in more 
detail in a moment. 
 
Post-Traditional.  ‘Post-traditional’ is what I have termed that presumably transitional stage 
in which Oman and its fellow states in the Arabian Peninsula presently find themselves.  
‘Post-traditional’ may be said to lie on a scale where ‘traditional’ is at one end and ‘modern’ 
is at the other.  This classification owes much to S.N. Eisenstadt but, as shall be shown 
shortly, I have modified it slightly to introduce another stage, that of ‘neo-traditional’.  
Examination of the post-traditional phase lies at the heart of the present inquiry with Oman 
serving as the prism through which to examine its workings. 
 
Emergence.  In contriving the title for this essay, I found myself torn between the terms 
‘origins’ and ‘emergence’.  The difference between the two concepts is significant but 
perhaps slight in the larger picture.  In essence, my intention is to suggest that Oman – as 
well as its neighbours – has embarked upon the path towards modernisation only recently, 
although – and here emergence seems better suited to the purpose at hand – it has taken 
significant and noteworthy steps towards that goal. 
 
Proceeding from that brief explanation, let me turn to a more careful discussion of the 
terminology involved. 
 
 
THE TRADITIONAL-MODERN TYPOLOGY 
 
Traditional Rulers in the Arabian Peninsula 
My conception of ‘traditional’ here is very loosely defined, essentially meaning the situation 
before ‘modernist’ impulses began to have an impact on Oman and the Arabian Peninsula 
states.  I do not intend to give a single, embracing definition to the term, as this would be 
counter-productive.  One could argue that the Portuguese conquest of Muscat and other 
Omani coastal towns and their subsequent occupation during the 15th and 16th centuries 
contributed a strong impact on modernisation:  after all, the succeeding al-Yacaribah dynasty, 
victorious in ousting the Portuguese, utilized Portuguese military and technological principles 
and organisation in creating one of the largest naval fleets in the western Indian Ocean and 
used it to follow the Portuguese down the coast of Africa, ousting them in turn from their 
strongholds as far as the reaches of Mozambique. 
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I also would note the impossibility of defining ‘traditional’ as a static condition fixed in a 
particular time, and quote Southeast Asian scholar J. Tambieh on this point:  ‘Tradition ... is 
used most of the time in an uncritical “ahistorical” sense to denote some kind of collective 
heritage that has supposedly been transmitted relatively unchanged from the past.  By 
conceiving of tradition in this way, two things tend to be forgotten:  that the past was, perhaps, 
as open and dynamic to the actors of that time as our own age appears to us; and that the 
norms, rules, and orientations of the past were not necessarily as consistent, unified, and 
coherent as we tend to imagine’.8 
 
Indeed, in a fundamental way, my application of the term ‘traditional’ to the Al Bu Sacid state 
through the early 20th century is something of a misnomer.  Following Eisenstadt’s 
conception, ‘In traditional regimes, legitimation of the rulers has been couched in basically 
traditional religious terms.  Moreover, the subject’s basic political role is little distinguished 
from his other societal roles – such as membership in local kinship or “status” communities.  
His political role has often been embedded in such groups, and the citizen or subject does not 
exercise any actual, direct, or symbolic political rights through a system of voting or 
franchise’.9  By this distinction, the ‘traditional’ state in Oman would be that of the Ibadi 
imamate and the Al Bu Sacid state – despite its initial dynast’s election as imam – would be 
an innovation. 
 
But, nevertheless, I believe it is useful to term the Al Bu Sacid state ‘traditional’ in order to 
contrast it with the succeeding brief phase of the neo-traditional state.  Whilst Al Bu Sacid 
rulers surrendered pretension to rule as imams relatively early, their subsequent rule 
depended on their claim to a ‘traditional’ legitimacy based on such factors as their general 
adherence to the requirements of a just and legitimate rule according to the tenets of Islam; 
their emergence from one of the recognized Omani tribes and thus full members of the 
fundamental Omani tribal political system; their competence, at least minimally, in providing 
order in the country; their role in maintaining and utilising relations with the outside world, 
especially Britain; and, perhaps most importantly, their eventual historical record as the 
principal rulers of Oman for several centuries.10 
 
This should not obscure the subtle transformation of the terms of Al Bu Sacid authority – 
from imam (i.e., a religious cum temporal leader) to sayyid (a purely temporal ruler based on 
transitory power, akin to the term hakim used by aspiring tribal shaykhs elsewhere in the Gulf) 
to sultan (a term first applied to the Al Bu Sacid by the British, which in its basic Arabic 
sense means ‘power’ and was first applied to the Seljuk powers behind the cAbbasid throne 
and only later acquired widespread usage as a major temporal title, roughly equivalent to 
‘king’).  This transformation of authority undoubtedly best explains why the Al Bu Sacid 
dynasts acquiesced in acceptance of their designation as sultans, a term redolent with 
antipathy in Ibadi thought.  It also explains why the Al Bu Sacid family adopted the honorific 
‘sayyid’ to provide themselves with ascriptive rank in a context in which the Ibadi imamate 
proscribes titles for relatives of the imam and ‘shaykh’ refers to tribal leadership.11 
 
Notwithstanding these caveats, my working definition of ‘traditional state’ for the purposes 
of this paper is the Al Bu Sacid era until the abdication of Sultan Taymur b. Faysal in late 
1931.  I do this because Sultan Taymur and his immediate predecessors ruled in much the 
same manner as their forebears had with a minimalist government and they assumed or 
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demanded a ‘traditional’ legitimacy.  This definition of ‘traditional state’ also applies to other 
Arabian rulers of the 19th and early 20th centuries. 
 
 
Neo-traditional Rulers 
 
But the first half of the 20th century – in some cases extending into the second half of the 
same century – saw the emergence of a new type of ruler, seeking to create new means of 
control in order to preserve their conception of the ‘traditional’ order of things.  These leaders 
and the states they constructed may be termed ‘neo-traditional’.  As I have written elsewhere, 
‘These individuals sought to preserve the existing traditional society, values and goals, by 
enhancing or enlarging the capability to control the state.  In so doing, however, they altered 
the nature of the decentralized political system, transforming the basis of authority from 
traditional to neo-traditional’.12 
 
Prime examples of neo-traditional leaders in the Arabian Peninsula would be the Imams of 
Yemen Yahya b. Muhammad Hamid al-Din (r. 1904-1948) and his son Ahmad (r. 1948-
1962), Imam (later King) of Saudi Arabia cAbd al-cAziz b. cAbd al-Rahman Al Sacud (r. 
1902-1953), and Sultan of Oman Sacid b. Taymur Al Sacid (r. 1932-1970). 
 
But neo-traditional rulers were fighting a losing battle.  As I have put it elsewhere, ‘the neo-
traditional states were unable to cope with the wide scope and deep-seated nature of emerging 
challenges to their legitimacy. Most important, perhaps, were the growing pressures upon the 
state to allow socioeconomic change and even to promote it through systematic development 
efforts.  [States] were unable to erect thorough barriers against the intrusions of the modern 
world’.13  Because their conceptions fundamentally were flawed and their ability to execute 
their goals limited, their neo-traditional edifices were doomed to be swept away by newer 
conceptions of post-traditional constructions.14 
 
Fundamentally, neo-traditional leaders faced ‘a crumbling of legitimacy ... [from] the 
traditionalists, who opposed any change, and the modernists, who saw not nearly enough 
change.  Facing widespread opposition, the neo-traditional rulers moved increasingly towards 
paternalism and eventually [stark] authoritarianism, thereby largely forfeiting claims to 
legitimacy’.15 
 
 
Modern or Modernising States? 
 
This brings us to the present status of the states of the Arabian Peninsula.  All seven regimes 
proclaim themselves as ‘modernising’, particularly in terms of socioeconomic development, 
yet they are not modern. 
 
Modern societies, as contrasted with more traditional systems, continuously face the crucial 
problem of the ability of their central frameworks to ‘expand.’  The demand for or 
expectation of such ‘expansion’ can develop in several different ... directions:  aspirations for 
the creation or maintenance of new, wider, political frameworks; for economic or 
administrative development or ‘modernization’ for greater societal responsiveness, especially 
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in the elaboration of new principles of distribution; for redefinition of the boundaries and 
symbols of the collectivity and for more direct access to the center.16 
 
The oft-repeated claim of these regimes that they wish to provide for economic development 
without changing or transforming the ‘traditions’ of society and culture is another example of 
their situation somewhere between neo-traditional and post-traditional. 
 
Ipso facto, these cannot be modern states because they are monarchies whose monarchs are 
recruited exclusively from dynastic families and who exercise unbridled authority.  Rulers 
and ruling families are assisted in the process of ruling by a combination of traditional elites 
– culama’, other high-status allied families and shaykhly families, and established merchant 
families – and newly emerged elites – including senior government officials, nouveaux riches 
merchants (many of whom have based their ascendance on privileged access to or 
employment in the government), and the educated.17 
 
 
Post-Traditional Rulers and States 
 
If not traditional – and no longer neo-traditional – but not yet modern, then what are these 
states?  They can best be described as ‘post-traditional’ states.  That is to say, they are states 
that seek modernisation as a goal but continue to insist on – and are hampered by – many 
‘traditional’ values and structures. As Eisenstadt points out: 
 
Any attempt to establish and maintain a new post-traditional order creates problems, conflicts, 
and tensions unparalleled in other situations of change.  The transition to a modern, post-
traditional order constitutes a focus around which severe conflicts and struggles tend to 
develop – borne most visibly by social movements, political elites and groups, and different 
social and political coalitions.   Through such processes of struggle crystallize most of the 
contours of post-traditional orders – such as the ability of the post-traditional order and 
political regime to institutionalize new types of center-periphery relations as well as new 
patterns of institutionalization.  Obviously, the establishment of such an order does not 
necessarily obliterate traditional forces in general or arrest the continuity of traditional 
cultural models in particular.18 
 
Now that the stage has been set, it is time to turn attention specifically to Oman.  I will begin 
by contrasting the radically different outlooks of Oman’s last two rulers. 
 
 
SAcID B. TAYMUR AS A NEO-TRADITIONAL RULER 
 
Sultan Sacid b. Taymur was an archetype of the neo-traditional ruler.  He continued the 
patriarchy of his ancestors, relying on a minimalist government and employing direct contact 
with and control over his subordinates.  He was a true fiscal conservative, who believed fully 
in the maxim that you should not spend unless you absolutely must, and then you should not 
spend on an item unless you have all the funds required in hand already and unless you are 
certain it will not require future expenditures that you cannot meet.  Sacid b. Taymur kept his 
country as closed off and inaccessible as possible, maintaining diplomatic relations only with 
Britain (and later India).  He displayed strict personal adherence to traditional social values 
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and religious requirements, and sought to enforce this outlook and lifestyle on his subjects in 
the best paternalistic manner. 
 
In part, these traits can be seen as the outlook of a ‘traditionalist’, not much different from his 
father Taymur b. Faysal and his grandfather Faysal b. Turki.  But from the early or mid-
1950s, Sacid b. Taymur began to appear more clearly as a neo-traditionalist.  His need for 
more income led him to permit the entry of Petroleum Development (Oman) into the heart of 
the country.  The requirement that the oil expedition be accompanied by an armed force, the 
Muscat and Oman Field Force, eventually resulted in the impromptu restoration of Sultanate 
authority over the interior (following the death in 1954 of Imam Muhammad b. cAbdullah al-
Khalili).  Al Bu Sacid control over the interior was restored, but in such a way that could not 
have been done by a traditional leader. 
 
In order to prevent the recrudescence of the imamate, with Saudi and Egyptian help, the 
Sultan was forced to accept British military and financial assistance.  Thus, the Sultan’s 
Armed Forces (SAF) were born in 1958.  This turned out to be a pivotal event in a number of 
ways.  SAF clearly established the Sultan’s authority throughout northern Oman.  The only 
exceptions were the retreat of the imamate leaders to the top of al-Jabal al-Akhdar (from 
which they were driven in early 1959 by combined operations by the British Special Air 
Service SAS and SAF) and continuing small acts of mining roads and other sabotage. 
 
All shaykhs and their tribes found themselves subject to the rule of the Sultan, as enforced by 
SAF, and SAF guaranteed the authority of the walis (the Sultan’s representatives).  Beyond 
strictly military duties, SAF carried out civil development projects, such as the reconstruction 
of the villages and aflaj (water systems) atop the Sayq plateau after al-Jabal al-Akhdar war.  
Elsewhere, SAF engineers improved tracks and roads and built water supplies and SAF 
provided transportation and assistance for walis.  The creation of a ‘tribal intelligence’ 
capability within the armed forces served as a mechanism not only for keeping abreast of 
what was happening throughout the country, but it also became a conduit by which 
grievances and requests were transmitted to the government and assistance could be provided 
to tribes and localities. 
 
Sultan Sacid b. Taymur maintained his aloofness and inaccessibility from his subjects, most 
notably by his permanent retreat to Salalah (in the south of the country) in 1958 and his 
failure to return to Muscat.  Furthermore, he ruled as a strong-willed nationalist, 
consolidating political authority and control in his own hands.  He did not, of course, 
represent himself as an Ibadi imam, even informally without the process of election, which 
would have rendered him dependent on the continued approval of the Ibadi (and thus Omani) 
community.19 
 
He worked through a minimum of officials who were personally responsible only to him and 
did not represent independent power bases:  Sayyid Ahmad b. Ibrahim, Sayyid Shihab b. 
Faysal, Pat Waterfield, Leslie Chauncy, and Shaykh Ahmad b. Muhammad al-Harithi.  It is 
perhaps not coincidental that these officials were either family members or expatriates, 
neither of whom possessed the capability or sufficient reasons to challenge the Sultan.  The 
one exception in this list was Ahmad al-Harithi, the shaykh of the important al-Hirth tribe of 
al-Sharqiyah region.  But it should be remembered that his ascendancy as shaykh of al-Hirth  
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came only through his recognition as such by the Sultan and his continued status as such, in 
the face of at least potential tribal and family opposition, depended on serving the Sultan well. 
 
In order to maintain the ‘traditional’ character of the state and society, Sultan Sacid was 
forced increasingly to maintain and expand his tight control of the government apparatus.  
This was achieved partly through his myriad restrictions on the lives and aspirations of his 
subjects, and partly through his acceptance of larger and more capable security forces to 
counter the growing rebellion in Dhufar and the rising dissident threats to northern Oman. 
 
Although the Sultan’s authority was ultimately unquestioned after the mid-1950s (because of 
the absence of alternative sources of authority and the enforcement capabilities of SAF), he – 
or more precisely, his governments and/or agents – did not directly intervene in local and 
tribal matters.  These were generally left to shaykhs and notables as had been the case 
traditionally, with such matters attracting the attention of the Sultan and his ‘central 
government’ when affairs intersected with other tribes or national concerns. 
 
Until the very late 1960s, Sultan Sacid’s essential goal was to retain control over Oman by 
keeping affairs as unchanged as possible.  Was his fundamental outlook altered by the receipt 
of oil revenues, first received in 1968?  On the one hand, it can be argued that, yes, his 
outlook did change since he began to institute a number of modest development programs.20  
On the other hand, it can also be argued that, no, it did not alter his outlook, since these 
programs were not intended to change the character of the country but simply to provide 
basic improvements.21  It is impossible to assess any long-term change in his attitude because 
he was never given the opportunity to develop any. 
 
 
QABUS B. SAcID AS A POST-TRADITIONAL RULER 
 
Evidence of the ‘modernising’ intentions of Sultan Qabus is ample.  To start with, there is his 
educational background in the United Kingdom, beginning with schooling in East Anglia and 
proceeding through Sandhurst and then a brief attachment to local government, again in East 
Anglia, and an equally brief tour with the British Army of the Rhine.  In addition and early 
on, Qabus authoritatively stamped his personality on the new regime – emphatically making 
a clean break with the past of his father.  One of his first declarations upon acceding as Sultan 
concerned his intention to develop the country:  ‘I promise you to dedicate myself to the 
speedy establishment of a modern government in no time. ... My people, I shall work as 
promptly as possible to ensure a better life in a better future. ... My people and brothers, 
yesterday we were completely in the dark, but with the aid of God, tomorrow a new dawn 
will arise for Muscat and Oman and its people’.22  This was quickly followed by his creation 
of a government to carry out this central task. 
 
But many characteristics mark him clearly as a post-traditional ruler.  And beyond his 
personal beliefs and inclinations, it should be kept in mind that his objectives are very 
strongly constrained by the country’s broader post-traditional status.  Aspects of Sultan 
Qabus’s personality in this context include his clear determination to retain all ultimate 
authority in his own hands.  This conviction surfaced early in his reign during his struggle 
over conflicting goals with his uncle and Prime Minister Tariq b. Taymur:  the Sultan saw 
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himself as a benevolent monarch, retaining all authority, while Sayyid Tariq pushed for 
implementation of his conception of a constitutional monarchy.  Tariq lasted little more than 
a year in the office before he felt himself forced to resign and there has never been another 
prime minister (apart from the Sultan declaring himself as holder of the office). 
 
Other evidence of post-traditionalism in the Sultan includes his adoption and extension of 
royal trappings.  Indeed, the adjective sultani in Arabic is invariably and officially translated 
as ‘royal’ and at one point early in his reign there was consideration of a change in title from 
sultan to king.23  In this context of royal appearance, it is also noteworthy that Sultan Qabus 
and his forebears dispensed with the key symbolic act of traditional legitimacy, the baycah (or 
oath of allegiance).  In the Ibadi imamate, an imam was not recognised as such until the 
notables and culama’ had given him their baycah.  Sultan Qabus is the ruler simply because 
he overthrew the previous ruler, his father, and thereupon seized the reins of power. 24
 
In addition, the Sultan has encouraged a cult of personality.  Nearly everything new in the 
country is named after him:  Mina’ Qabus, the country’s principal port; Tariq Qabus, the 
capital’s main thoroughfare; Madinat Qabus, the country’s first modern housing project; the 
Sultan Qabus Sports Complex; the new Qabus mosques which dominate most major towns.  
In part, this may represent a dearth of prominent family members whose names in 
neighbouring countries are liberally sprinkled across projects in conjunction that of the ruler.  
But, still, there are other members of the ruling Al Sacid family whose names are never 
signposted and the only edifice to date with the previous Sultan’s name is the Sacid b. 
Taymur Mosque in al-Khuwayr suburb of Muscat. 
 
Indeed, the appearance of this striking Ottoman-style mosque is a bit of a surprise, given the 
present Sultan’s apparent ambivalence in his feelings towards his father and the obvious 
intention of denigrating everything pre-1970 and celebrating only post-1970 
accomplishments.  It might be conjectured that a part of Sultan Qabus’s ambivalence is the 
strong similarity in habits and characteristics shared by father and son.  They share a shyness 
that most closely translates into an aloofness from family and general population alike.  Both 
have kept the essential reins of power very much in their own hands and have been loath to 
delegate responsibility to others, including senior members of their own family.  Similarly, 
both have refused to name or groom an heir.  It is also significant that both have evinced a 
special attraction to Dhufar (the southern region of Oman), one through adoption and the 
other through birth, where both have tended to spend sizeable periods of their time and been 
largely inaccessible there. 
 
 
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE POST-TRADITIONAL STATE IN OMAN 
 
We return again to the meaning of ‘post-traditional’.  Or, to put it another way, why is Oman 
post-traditional and not modern?  The first piece of evidence is the patriarchical nature of the 
state, which in turn is built upon a foundation of the patriarchical nature of society.  The ruler, 
like the shaykh of the tribe, like the father of a family, is the father of his country.  He 
demands respect, obedience, and total loyalty.  In exchange, he assumes responsibility for the 
protection and welfare of his constituents. 
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This traditional pattern of patriarchy has been reinforced in Oman, as well as to an even 
greater degree in the other Gulf states, by the accrual of oil revenues to the state and thus to 
the ruler as the guardian of the state.  The consequence of oil has been, and continues to 
remain, the dependence of the economy, and especially the state, on oil revenues – if Oman is 
not completely a rentier state, it certainly is not a self-sustaining economy in the absence of 
oil.  This leads not only to economic dependence on the state as the engine of growth as well 
as the maintainer of an orderly economy.  It also produces social dependence on the state as 
employer (including both the civil service and the security services), provider of social 
welfare programs, arbiter of propriety and acceptability, and definer of cultural, social, and 
political values.  Just as the members of a patriarchal family depend on the father to take care 
of them, so Omanis display an expectation that the state must initiate and supervise action in 
nearly all spheres and to guarantee the results. 
 
The construction of the new Omani state also displayed, inevitably, a combination of neo-
traditional and post-traditional characteristics, especially in the beginning but not limited to 
that period.  First, there was quest for suitable government personnel.  In time-honoured 
fashion, many of the early personnel were expatriate, primarily British.  The few senior 
members of the old Sultan’s government found it expedient to retire upon news of the coup.  
The selection process for the first Omani officials of the new government was based on 
several factors.  One was practicality, embracing those who had at least a modicum of 
education or experience and who knew some English.  But, equally, appointments were made 
on the basis of representation of important constituencies and personal ties. 
 
For example, the four men named to the first cabinet announced on 15 August 1970 were:  Dr. 
cAsim b. cAli al-Jamali, Minister of Health; Sayyid Badr b. Saud Al Bu Sacidi, Minister of the 
Interior; Shaykh Sacud b. cAli al-Khalili, Minister of Education; and Sayyid Muhammad b. 
Ahmad Al Bu Sacidi, Minister of Justice.  Of these four, two were members of the larger Al 
Bu Sacid family from which the sultans come.  Their appointments were in addition, of 
course, to the prominent positions of two members of the sultan’s immediate family (the Al 
Sacid), i.e. his uncle Tariq b. Taymur as Prime Minister and his cousin Thuwayni b. Shihab as 
the Sultan’s Representative.  Of the two remaining portfolios, Health went to a competent 
and respected medical doctor who at the same time was an old and close friend of Sayyid 
Tariq, the Prime Minister.  The choice as Minister of Education may have been seen as 
surprising since the individual concerned possessed only a traditional education; more to the 
point, however, he was a nephew of the last indisputably legitimate Ibadi imam and a 
member of the shaykhly family of one of the largest and most important tribes of Oman. 
 
By these and other contemporaneous as well as later appointments, it can be seen that the 
new regime worked carefully to modify, and not replace, traditional centre-periphery 
relations.  This process took place even as the regime assiduously assumed new functions of 
government not seen in Oman hitherto (e.g., the various social service ministries and a 
national police).  It should be remembered as well that the walis, the representatives of the 
Sultan throughout the country, continued to be drawn largely from the Al Bu Sacid family 
and other families that had long provided such officials. 
 
Through the next few decades, the Qabus regime could be seen to display a number of 
enduring characteristics.  One of these was the retention of many of the old methods of 
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interaction and governing.  Even into the new millennium, ministerial appointments (and 
ousters as well) were announced without explanation, justification, or at times seeming 
rationality, even sometimes surprising those so anointed.  Following such shuffles, Muscat 
and the country would be alive with rumours about why so-and-so had been appointed:  was 
it because he hailed from the same tribe as the Minister of the Royal Office?  Or was he a 
business partner of one or more of the Sultan’s close advisers?  Was his appointment because 
he was simply a suitable representative of a principal tribe or region?  It did seem unlikely 
that al-Dhahirah region, historically on the periphery of Omani politics, should produce such 
a proportionately high number of appointees of ministerial rank, unless one notes the region’s 
proximity to far wealthier and tempting Abu Dhabi and the close connection that some of the 
appointees’ tribes maintained with Saudi Arabia during its claim to al-Buraymi oasis. 
 
Once ensconced in a ministry, the incumbent minister tended to make it his fiefdom, secure 
in the knowledge that as long as he did not displease the Sultan, he could be assured of a 
reasonably lengthy tenure, which in a few cases encompassed several decades.  Although 
under-secretaries are in theory the highest civil service ranks (whereas ministers are political 
appointments), it is striking how many under-secretaries (as well as office directors, 
directors-general and directors) seemed to hail from the same region or even the same tribe as 
their ministers.  Even in later years when more and more educated and technically competent 
candidates for high office were appointed, a pattern of regional and tribal mixes continued to 
prevail.
 
At its foundations, the Omani regime continues to display a highly patrimonial nature, 
accentuated by the solitary and absolute figure of Sultan Qabus at its acme.  This is not to say 
that the post-1970 regime has not registered major accomplishments or that it has become 
stagnant in its operation and direction.  The government administration is often quite 
functional and effective.  The foundations of a proper civil service have been laid.  The 
regime has done much to create a socio-economic infrastructure that has notably improved its 
people’s standards of living.  The position of women has improved considerably and women 
serve as ministers, under-secretaries, ambassadors, and members of the Majlis al-Shura and 
the appointed Majlis Oman.  Oil, and gas, income has been harnessed to public requirements 
with a relatively minimal wastage or diversion to private interests.  In recent years, emphasis 
has been laid on encouraging an expansion of the private sector and of course Oman made the 
adjustments necessary for admission to the World Trade Organisation.  In the political realm, 
Sultan Qabus introduced in 1996 a Basic Law that codified the outline and purpose of the 
state and its organs. 
 
Rather, in spite of all progress that has been made, Oman remains bound by its post-
traditional constraints.  An extreme view of Oman’s situation – as a microcosm of the 
situation prevailing throughout the Arab world – is Hisham Sharabi’s conception of 
‘neopatriarchy’, a hybrid society or culture representing a fusion of traditional patriarchy with 
a ‘deformed modernisation’ rooted in dependency relations with the West:  ‘Material 
modernization, the first (surface) manifestation of social change, only served to remodel and 
reorganize patriarchal structures and relations and to reinforce them by giving them “modern” 
forms and appearances.’25 
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Legally the Sultan rules by decree and politically he reigns by fiat.  There is no court of 
appeal against his decisions and justice in Oman depends in large part on the Sultan’s 
inherent sense of fairness and his diligence to duty.  Cronyism, certainly at higher levels, 
persists and corruption is not only significant but punishment is haphazard.  Tribal, regional, 
and communal identities persist on a level of intensity nearly equal to national identity.  
While the animosities of previous eras have declined, these subnational identities are often 
utilized to tweak the system and procure favours, jobs, and money.  Representative 
institutions, such as the Majlis al-Shura (consultative council), remain extremely restricted, 
and freedoms of speech, the arts, and the media are severely circumscribed. 
 
 
THE EMERGENCE OF OMAN AS A NATION-STATE 
 
There has long existed a sense of the Omani nation but the emergence of Oman as a nation-
state in the modern context has been hampered by the post-traditionalism of the regime and 
society.  A return to the writings of Eisenstadt is perhaps instructive, particularly his 
examination of the development of democracies as modern states.  In this context, Eisenstadt 
notes that, 
Like all modern regimes, constitutional democratic regimes developed within the framework 
of the formation in Europe of modern territorial states and developed with the crystallization 
of new types of collectivities, with the evolution of new state-society relations most fully 
manifest in the emergence of civil society, with the concomitant transformation of political 
processes and, finally with the rise of modern market, capitalist, political economies. 
 
The emergence of the first modern states in Europe entailed administrative centralization and 
relatively clearly defined territorial boundaries.  The political community was conceived as 
autonomous, no longer subsumed under a broader “religious” canopy. This conception, which 
emerged in continental Europe and in England in close connection with the Reformation, 
Counter-Reformation, and the ensuing Wars of Religion, involved the transformation – even 
if haltingly and intermittently – of the basic conception of sovereignty that began as 
dominium politicum and regale.  In many continental states, the state was now defined in 
secular terms, even if absolutist kings claimed some type of divine legitimation – the 
so-called divine right of kings.  It was the sovereign – the king or the state (‘L’Etat c’est moi’) 
– who presented and promulgated, even if never wholly unchallenged, as the embodiment of 
what could be called the general will, the general good of society.26 
 
He goes on to observe that, 
 
The development in Europe of modern states and collectivities and the transformation of the 
notion of sovereignty were closely related to changes in the power structure of society, 
namely, the emergence of multiple centers of economic and political power and the 
development of some nuclei of distinctive new types of civil society and of public arenas or 
spheres.  The development of multiplicity of centers of power and of the nuclei of civil 
society was closely related to the development of a new type of political economy and of new 
modes of production, namely the market economy, first of commercial and later of industrial 
capitalism.27 
 
Furthermore, 
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The transformation of the basic premises of the social and political order became interwoven 
with a parallel transformation and institutionalization of the conceptions of sovereignty, of 
citizenship, of representative institutions, and of accountability of rulers.  The transformation 
of these premises entailed, first of all, a radical transformation of the basic concepts of 
sovereignty.  The core of this transformation, which took place above all in the Great 
Revolutions, was the transfer of the locus of sovereignty to “the people” and the related 
development of the concept of popular sovereignty.  At the same time, the concepts and 
practices of citizenship, representation, and accountability of rulers were transformed.  
Citizenship was changed from an acclamatory or ratifying act into a participatory act; 
representation was transformed from virtual to actual.28 
 
Where, then, does the Sultanate of Oman exist, in political terms, in relation to Eisenstadt’s 
conceptions of modern democracies?  Sovereignty is unambiguously vested in the Sultan, 
who delegates authority – on his terms – to his ministers and other officials and permits 
comment – within the limits he sets – by the citizenry.  In fundamental ways, the status of the 
Sultan equates to the divine legitimation of earlier European kings:  notwithstanding the 
Basic Law’s definition of Oman as an Islamic state with the sharicah (Islamic law) as the 
source of legislation, the state is determinedly secular in its source of sovereignty and 
application of its authority.29 
 
Considerable effort is made to express the Islamic legitimacy of the state and its leader.  For 
example, the Sultan is seen to carefully observe Islamic rituals in public, the announcement 
of the first consultative council was made by his adviser on religious affairs, he is said to 
have given the khutbah (Friday sermon) on occasion, and Qabus mosques established by 
donations from his private purse dot the countryside.  Nevertheless, the emphasis is not 
stressed overly vigorously – it consists of a superficial Islamic legitimacy, probably because 
the utility of religion as a unifying and legitimising force has the potential to be undermined 
by either or both of two factors.  On the one hand, although there is no agitation for a return 
to the Ibadi imamate, the sultans have usurped the role of the imam as the temporal head of 
the Omani community and have replaced the imam’s function as the spiritual leader of the 
community by the innovation of a state-appointed mufti (supreme religious authority).  On 
the other hand, overly prominent reliance on or claim to Islamic credentials may well 
provoke emerging Islamist opposition, both internal and external. 
 
There seems little dispute over the Sultanate of Oman’s existence as some sort of a nation-
state.  The composition of the Omani nation is universally agreed, particularly since the 
integration of Dhufar into Oman from the 1970s onward.  A sense of Omani identity has 
existed for centuries, perhaps millennia.  Until recently, that identity encompassed the Oman 
Coast or Trucial Coast, now the United Arab Emirates (UAE), but the UAE has now acquired 
its own national identity.  At most, some sectors of the majority community, essentially 
defined as Arab, tribal and Ibadi or Sunni, may contest the ‘Omaniness’ of certain minority 
groups, such as the Baluch and Lawatiyah, but this is not a serious issue.30  Furthermore, the 
boundaries of the state have existed virtually unchanged over the course of at least a century, 
despite contestation by the imamate in northern Oman and by the Dhufari insurgents in 
southern Oman. 
 
But in most other ways, Oman does not fit the criteria accepted of a modern nation-state, let 
alone, obviously, that of a democracy.  Even as set out in the Basic Law, there is little 
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accountability of the ruler.  Article Seven states that ‘The Sultan, before exercising his 
authority, shall, in a joint session of the Oman Council and Defence Council, take the 
following oath – “I swear to God Almighty to respect the State’s charter and the laws, and to 
safeguard the interests of the citizens and their rights, and to defend the sovereignty and the 
integrity of its territories”’.  The Sultanate, as it exists today, would seem to fit most closely 
to Eisenstadt’s description of absolutist authority as existed in pre-revolutionary France, 
‘which was promulgated by the central royal-bureaucratic center that attempted to present 
itself as the central locus of authority by virtue of its being the bearer of rational 
enlightenment.’31  Or put another way, the figure of the Sultan may correspond to Weber’s 
charismatic authority. 
 
As loci of sovereignty, the other two sources of authority in pre-revolutionary France do not 
exist in any significant degree in Oman.  Representative institutions are in an extremely 
nascent state and remain ‘gifts’ of the Sultan.  The establishment of popular will as a 
foundation of sovereignty has yet to find acceptance by the state or even expression by much 
of the citizenry.  Indeed, the closest that popular representation is entertained officially in the 
Sultanate is in Article Nine of the Basic Law, which states that ‘citizens, according to this 
charter and its provisions and other legal enactments, have the right to participate in general 
affairs’.  There is no evidence of any partnership or reciprocity, let alone acceptable channels 
of protest, between authority and citizenry, nor of any substantive challenge to existing 
authority.32  The nascent middle class is an emerging force in economic terms but carries no 
corresponding political influence.  Indeed, apart from some educated elements, agitation for a 
more substantial political role seems to be limited as most of the middle class, as is true 
elsewhere in the Gulf, remains preoccupied with materialism. 
 
Just as importantly, it should be remembered that the state – and ultimately the person of the 
Sultan – is not only the source of all power, but oil remains the engine of the state and thus 
the economy.33  Traditional economic sectors – such as fishing, farming, and herding – have 
declined and add marginal value, apart from providing significant employment.  The 
principal economic contribution of the private sector has been in providing imported goods 
and local services, supplemented by some import-substitution industries.  Oman’s 
participation in the global economy is mostly constricted to the export of oil and gas and the 
import of finished goods and labour.  Thus both Oman’s politics and economy remain solidly 
post-traditional. 
 
Similarly, Oman is constrained by a weakness in civil society.  Few institutions exist and 
those that do, such as the Oman Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the Graduates’ 
Society, are controlled and manipulated by the state.34  Television and radio are government 
monopolies and the few newspapers and other print media in private hands are as careful of 
not offending the government as those that are government-owned.  Few fora for public 
discussion and debate of national issues exist – the country is notable for the lack of editorial 
columns and the absence of letters to the editor in newspapers.35 
 
Oman has always been remarkably free from pronounced social stratification.  There have 
always been wealthy and poor, and some communities traditionally were regarded as inferior.  
The changes put in train in 1970 have done little to further differentiate society on the whole.  
They have, however, created two largely new and interrelated classes:  senior government 
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officials (or a bureaucratic elite) and a new capitalist merchant class.  It can be argued that the 
continued strength or durability of the post-traditional state is due in large part to both old 
and new elites who derive considerable benefit from the status quo and, conversely, who have 
the most to fear from ‘modernity’ because it threatens their status and privilege.  As a 
consequence, elites are hostile to any significant changes in the nature of the existing state 
and society. 
 
It is undoubtedly superfluous to add that there is no corresponding proletariat or industrial 
working class, apart from expatriates from various Asian countries.  While most Omanis have 
benefited in one or more ways from the country’s one-third-century of prosperity, the benefit 
to the majority of people has been in the provision of a basic social welfare system, 
acquisition of minimal education, and securing employment, generally with the government.  
The great balance of personal wealth, however, has accrued to the new elites, along with 
existing merchant families, and there have been few, if any, conscious efforts to redistribute 
resources. 
 
 
IMPLICATIONS FOR MODERNITY AND LEGITIMACY 
 
A pertinent, indeed central, question that must be asked here is whether Oman needs to be 
transformed into a democracy, Western-style or otherwise, in order to be modern.  The scale 
of traditional, neo-traditional, post-traditional (or modernising), and modern statuses 
explicated earlier in this essay implies a linear progression.  But is this necessarily the case?  
Such a conception is fraught with being tarred by charges of ethnocentricity as were raised 
during the debate regarding modernisation theory advanced in the 1950s and 1960s.36  One 
response to this shortcoming has been the introduction of the concept of multiple modernities 
to suggest that ‘Western patterns of modernity are not the only authentic modernities, 
although they enjoy historical precedence and continue to be a basic reference point for 
others’.37 
 
With this in mind, it is thus reasonable to assume that the emergence of a modern Oman, 
should that be the case, may well follow a unique path deriving from its still-potent 
traditional foundations and the tolerance and equanimity for which the country is noted.  Still, 
the envisaging of such a future rests upon resolution of a number of salient points.
 
Prime among these is the question of what is the extent of – or the prospects for – continued 
loyalty or legitimacy.  Loyalty in this context may have several objects.  It may be 
represented in terms of personal loyalty to Sultan Qabus.  In the early days of his rule, most 
Omanis when questioned about their feelings for their Sultan almost invariably replied that 
before him there was nothing and with him there was everything.  For Dhufaris, the Sultan is 
one of them:  he has been their champion in the uncertain integration into the larger Sultanate; 
for the jabbalis or people of the Dhufar mountains, he is also one of them and is responsible 
for bringing the long war of the 1960s and 1970s to a close. 
 
But the exhilaration of the early days of the regime and the ending of the Dhufar War have 
long since passed and dependence on volatile oil prices to finance the country’s growth and 
development has taken its toll.  Some 80% of all Omanis were not yet born in 1970.  No other 
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member of the ruling family has such close links with Dhufar.  The Sultan’s lavish spending 
on palaces and recently on the huge new congregational mosque on the outskirts of Muscat 
(in a country where the Ibadi tradition had little requirement for such mosques), his personal 
habits, and his continued aloofness may have brought his personal legitimacy into doubt. 
 
Beyond the personage of the Sultan lies the question of loyalty to the Al Sacid monarchy.  It 
is a small and weak family and there are few members who command loyalty.  The Sultan’s 
refusal to indicate an heir apparent and the studied indifference with which he receives his 
family members make any assessment of loyalty to the family difficult to assess.  And at an 
even deeper level, there must be some question of loyalty to the Sultanate as presently 
constituted.  While more than three decades of reinforcement have left a palpable sense of 
Omani national identity, there are potential fissions beneath the surface.  The richer UAE 
continues to draw in Omanis like a magnet, to work in the civil government and security 
forces alike.  Once settled in Abu Dhabi or Dubai – or Ra’s al-Khaymah, where the Shihuh of 
the Musandam migrate – these Omanis are pressured to take up UAE citizenship.  To the 
south, although Dhufar has been strongly integrated into the Sultanate, there will probably 
always remain at least the potential for a parting of the ways. 
 
Another source for concern is the extent to which demands have been or are being articulated 
for reform of the system or its modification or its replacement.  Demands for the latter have 
not been present since the Dhufar War (and associated activities in northern Oman) three 
decades ago.  Fortunately, Oman has been largely free from being sucked into the maelstrom 
of Islamist currents sweeping the region.  Similarly, calls for modification of the system have 
been muted, where even detectable, probably because of perceptions that the system seems 
alright as long as Qabus remains Sultan. 
 
But there are voices calling for reform of the existing system and these voices seem to be 
growing.  Educated Omanis, at least, are articulating in private demands for a greater say in 
decision-making, for some attention to be paid to their opinions and expertise.  Oman is 
notable for the absence of any fora for debate and dialogue.  The Majlis al-Shura is all-too-
often seen as ineffectual and little more than a tool of the state; its effectiveness, when it 
appears, is only marginally so, in such matters as expressing minor grievances over municipal 
or social service deficiencies.  There are also very real restrictions on the growth of civil 
society. 
 
What then is a potential proper future role for what is in many respects a relatively strong 
state with an essentially unified society?  Perhaps it may not be too far afield to look to the 
Turkish experience for enlightenment on Oman.  At first glance, Turkey may seem like an 
odd choice for comparison.  The country has been a strongly secular republic since the early 
1920s, with a representative democracy that, in times of crisis, has been suspended by a 
politically interventionist military apparatus.  Nevertheless, there are useful parallels.  As 
Turkish scholar Metin Heper has noted, 
 
Political conduct is shaped, inter alia, by the presence or absence of a generalizing, integrating 
and legitimizing state, and, if such a state does exist, by the degree to which state values and 
norms are intrinsically concentrated or diffused.  As noted, the existence of such a state in the 
Ottoman-Turkish polity constituted the qualitative difference between Turkey and most new 
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countries; as compared to European “state societies,” Turkey’s state values and norms have 
remained concentrated rather than diffused.38 
 
My intention here is not to suggest that the Omani military will intervene in times of 
perceived crisis (although this cannot be discounted entirely as a result of a possible 
succession crisis following the death of Sultan Qabus).  Rather, I wish to suggest that Oman 
also represents a strong state structure, at least on the surface, with an equally strong sense of 
national identity.  While not an avowedly secularist regime, the state acts in a largely secular 
manner.  Given Sultan Qabus’ military background and interest, the Omani security forces 
can be seen as a loyal praetorian guard whose essential interests lie in unquestioned support 
of both monarch and regime.  This, combined with the quiescent nature of Omani society, 
may confirm Charles Tilly’s thesis that although such factors as population growth, 
industrialization, urbanization, and other large-scale structural changes may affect the 
probabilities of revolution, principally by changing the parameters of and contenders for 
power, ‘There is no reliable and regular sense in which modernization breeds revolution.’39  
The key to peaceful transformation may lie in the particular nature of the impact of Oman’s 
increasing urbanization, which, as elsewhere, may bring completely new types of demands 
and interests from the periphery to the urban centres.40 
 
Alienation lies at the root of Arab malaise, contends Halim Barakat.  He sees this as the direct 
result of prevailing Arab politics: 
 
Arab citizens have been rendered powerless because they have been excluded from the 
political process.  Marginalized, and isolated from the human and material resources civil 
society should place at their disposal, the people of the area suffer from state tyranny over 
society.  The most vital functions of society in “progressive” as well as “conservative” Arab 
states have been constantly undermined by authoritarian rule.  Citizens of Arab countries have 
been denied the basic right to participate in the political process.41 
 
It can be argued convincingly that passivity, as much if not more than alienation, defines 
public attitude in Oman today.  Indeed, it is surprising, and something to be admired, how 
well Omanis have adjusted to the enormous changes of the past 34 years.  It can be argued as 
well that the regime under Qabus b. Sacid has been, on balance, benevolent and concerned for 
the welfare of the Omani people.  Nevertheless, the existing constraints and limitations as 
outlined above mean that the country cannot realize its full potential until it escapes its post-
traditional predicament. 
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This essay began by noting two contemporary themes of thinking about the Middle 
East and its monarchies:  their resilience and the argument for Middle Eastern 
exceptionalism.  The preceding analysis should have made clear the reasons for the 
resilience of the current regime in Oman; whether those reasons constitute an 
exception to the arguments that the emergence of ‘modernity’ in Oman means the 
authentic ‘constitutionalisation’ of the monarchy, or even its demise, is a matter for 
future consideration. 
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